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ABSTRACT
The document discusses selected global economic developments for the year under review 
which are deemed to be of interest to the Caribbean policy maker. It begins by describing patterns 
of growth and inflation in the industrial, developing and transition countries, outlining the salient 
macroeconomic and global factors/determinants of such developments. It provides a brief 
overview of global trade focussing on the institutional arrangements being negotiated to conduct 
it. The document concludes with a description of international capital flows and trends in 
international debt, focussing on the most seriously indebted among them and recent measures 
being applied for the amelioration of debt in those countries.
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This paper continues the practice, started in 1994, of discussing selected global economic developments 
of interest to the Caribbean policy maker. Its objective is to provide background information about the economic 
context in which the open island economies must operate, especially as they seek to integrate these economies 
globally. It also tries to identify, by way of comparative analysis, those policies which work and for whom. It is 
to be seen as a complement to the Survey of Caribbean Economic Performance, which is published in the second 
quarter of each year and, therefore, does not go into Caribbean developments in any depth.
Any current study of world trends cannot help but be struck by the rapid pace of global integration and 
the high degree of complementarity which is growing among the industrial, developing and transitional countries. 
All the macroeconomic indicators point in that direction, notably trade and capital flows which are both growing 
faster than global output while the unidirectional link, whereby industrial country growth provided the engine for 
he developing country economies, seems to be evolving into a more interdependent relationship. This has been 
made possible because the developing countries’ economies have continual to expand faster than those of the 
industrial countries to develop some momentum of their own. It has also been made possible by growing trade 
and investment links among the developing countries themselves. Accordingly, it has been estimated that the 
economic slowdown between 1991-1993 would have degenerated into a full blown global recession had it not 
been for the strong performance of the developing countries (IMF, 1996). Similar comments might also be made 
about 1996, where developing country performance continued to outstrip that of the industrial countries. Despite 
the progress being made in global integration, misgivings remain as to some of the means being used to achieve 
it. Misgivings also arise as a result of some of the rationale being used to justify increased integration while 
opposition to it is often based on an incomplete understanding of its costs and benefits.
The institutional arrangements being developed to foster integration are in some instances unwieldy and 
becoming increasingly complex. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 76 FTAs were either 
created or modified since 1948, more than half of which came into being after 1990. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, several integration schemes currently coexist; the North American Free Trade Arrangement (NAFTA) 
in the Northern hemisphere; the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) in the Caribbean; the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) in Central America; while bridging them is the Group of Three countries, 
comprising Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. In South America the Andean Group and the Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) operate jointly. Moreover, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) was formed in 
1994 to encompass 25 countries members of the CARICOM, CACM and Group of Three, as well as others in 
the Caribbean Basin not members of the aforementioned groups. Finally, between members of the Latin American 
; Integration Association (LAIA), 32 bilateral economic agreements had been signed (ECLAC, 1996a). These 
arrangements are proliferating rapidly and comprise several overlapping and possibly redundant arrangements. 
Some of them have been accused of diverting trade and their complexity could greatly complicate proposals for 
creating a wider hemispheric arrangement, such as the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas ( FTAA) or for 
progressing towards a more transparent global system, under the WTO.
The proliferation of bilateral trading arrangements is exacerbated when a country seeks to create the 
biggest bloc around itself with the objective of increasing its attractiveness to investment and improving its 
competitive position in the group. Aggressive free-traders often justify such attempts at market opening with 
arguments of increasing jobs. More traditionally, blocs justify protectionist action to defend members and to 
build export capacity while protecting against imports.
Several popular misconceptions are contained in these conflicting positions. Professor Stiglitz, President 
of the Council of Economic Advisers, in his 1997 Report to the President of the United States, rebutted them with 
some universally applicable advice, as follows:
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"In international, just as in domestic policy, two fundamentally different visions have 
long dominated the debate. At one extreme, countries interact atomistically in an 
undifferentiated world of free trade abroad and free markets at home. In this view international 
economic relations are just a matter o f opening markets. The other perspective harks back to 
18th century mercantilism, often supplemented with metaphors o f  the Cold War. It replaces 
ideological competition with economic competition and sees the gains ofone side o f the border 
as coming at the expense o f losses on the other. The trade deficit, in this view, replaces the 
missile gap as the measure o f national inadequacy. ”... "the new vision does not split the 
difference between these two views; rather it recognizes that the vision of trade as war is 
profoundly wrong. Trade is not a zero-sum game. It does not create a winner for every loser: all 
countries can gain ”. At the same time, "Defenders o f free trade can do it a disservice by 
promoting it as a way to create more jobs or to reduce bilateral trade deficits. Jobs, the 
unemployment rate and the overall balance o f payments are ultimately a consequence of 
macroeconomic policies, not o f trade barriers. The real objective o f free trade is to raise living 
standards by ensuring that (people) are working in areas where (they are) comparatively more 
productive than their trade partners " . . .  “trade has more impact on the distribution o f jobs than 
on the quantity of jobs. Finally, he noted that "Markets function best within an institutional 
environment that makes rules to promote free competition while facilitating the cooperation 
necessaryfor a stable world economy. What is required is a general understanding of the issues 
and difficulties in international trade and mutual commitments, o f the kind embodied in the 
GATT and the WTO, not to allow the pleadings o f special interests to interfere with the gains 
that all enjoyfrom free international trade ” (1997 Report of the Council o f Economic Advisers 
to the President P 21-22).
The rapid expansion of trade and investment has provided benefits to developing and industrial countries 
alike, die former from new industries and improved living conditions for those able to take advantage of global 
exposure, the latter from more diverse and robust sources of growth, with consequent mitigation of the wildest 
swings in the trade cycle. Yet while all countries benefit from globalization they have not benefited equally, 
neither have all people within countries been favoured by these gains. Disparities between and within countries 
have, therefore, become more evident Discrimination between countries takes place on the basis of how they are 
perceived as places to do business, that is on their macroeconomic and other policies, especially those relating 
to properly fimctioning product and factor markets. Discrimination within the labour force tends to take place 
on the basis of worker productivity, which is in turn related to levels of individual skill and work attitudes. 
Policies at the national level and those relating to the development and training of people are, therefore, of the 
utmost importance in determining who will benefit most from global interaction (ECLAC, 1996).
Countries should not try to isolate themselves from the process of global transformation, since it provides 
the most promising means of increasing their own and also global welfare. Nevertheless, explicit policies will 
need to be applied to mitigate its worst disparities. At the national level, governments must accelerate their 
macroeconomic policy reforms so as to integrate effectively into the global economy. They should also increase 
training for their people and strengthen legal frameworks and social safety nets to help the disadvantaged. 
Internationally, technical assistance will need to be strengthened to encourage appropriate policies, while the 
secular decline in financial assistance must be reversed so as to help those countries which are unable to benefit 
from international capital flows.
3




1993 1994 1995 1996
Global Output 2.4 2.4 3.7 3.5 3.8
Industrial countries 1.7 0.9 2.8 2.1 2.3
European Union 1.0 -0.5 2.8 2.5 1.6
Developing countries 6.4 6.3 6.6 5.9 6.3
Africa 0.8 0.9 2.9 3.0 5.0
Asia 8.8 8.7 9.1 8.6 8.0
Middle East and Europe 6.2 4.2 0.5 3.6 3.9
Latin America 2.7 3.8 5.3 0.3 3.4
Countries in transition -14.7 -8.5 -8.8 -1.3 0.4
Russia -18.7 -11.7 -14.8 -4.1 -0.9
Central and Easton Europe -9.9 -4.9 -2.9 1.2 1.6
Source: I.M.F. World Economic Outlook; ECLAC.
The tempo of global output quickened in 1996, while further progress was made in 
containing inflation, especially in the developing and transitional countries. Inflation remained 
controlled in the industrial countries allowing a gradual reduction in interest rates to shore up flagging 
economic activity in these countries. Modest rates also made developing country markets more 
attractive to capital and helped to reduce the cost of imports from those countries. Continuing the 
trend evident over the past five years, the developing countries achieved a more sustained pace of 
expansion than the industrial countries, with the former averaging just over 6 per cent, as compared 
with the latter which averaged scarcely 2 per cent. The developing country average was flattered by 
the inclusion of strong Asian performance, which over the period averaged nearly 9 per cent. 
Nevertheless, even without the Asian contribution the developing country average, at 4 per cent, still 
exceeded that of the industrial countries. The persistence of differential rates seemed to signify to 
some that the causal relationship between prosperity in the industrial countries leading to prosperity 
in the developing countries was being modified and a more interdependent relationship was being 
established, particularly with the countries of Asia.
The rate of increase in global output was modest, but fairly broad-based. More rapid growth 
was evident in both the industrial and the developing countries. In the former group, several European 
countries continued to experience difficulty in removing structural and macroeconomic constraints 
which limited the expansion of their economies. The pace of economic activity in developing regions
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Table n
INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Inflation <1>
Industrial countries 3.3 2.9 2.3 2.4 2.3
European Union 4.5 3.7 2.9 2.9 2.6
Japan 1.7 1.2 0.7 -0.1 0.2
U.S.A. 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.8 2.8
Developing countries 35.7 42.7 46.8 19.8 13.3
Africa 31.7 29.5 36.8 32.1 21.3
Asia 6.9 9.6 13.4 10.9 7.9
Middle East and Europe 25.9 24.0 31.5 32.5 25.6
Latin America 418.0 887.4 336.8 25.5 19.3
Countries in transition 681.2 614.3 264.8 128.0 413
Interest rates <2>
Major industrial countries 7.5 6.2 6.8 6.3 6.3
U.S.A. 7.0 5.9 7.1 6.6 6.6
Source: I.M.F. World Economic Outlook; ECLAC .
<1> Percentage change in consumer prices
<2> Long-term interest rates, in percent. 1996 relates to August 1996
Table m  
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (%)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1995
Industrial countries 7.8 8.2 8.1 7.7 7.8
Seven major industrial 7.2 7.3 7.2 6.8 7.0
France 10.3 11.6 12.3 11.6 12.4
Germany 7.7 8.9 9.6 9.4 10.3
United States 7.5 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.6
Source: I.M.F
seemed to be moving to a converging path, with all the developing countries growing more rapidly 
with the exception of Asia, where economic activity moderated steadily from the frenzied pace 
experienced in 1994. The countries in transition also experienced modest growth for the first time 
since their adaptation to the global economy commenced at the beginning of the decade, as private 










expansion evident in the various geographic groupings variety was, nevertheless, evident within and 
among them.
In the industrial countries growth cycles varied, the rate of expansion quickening 
substantially in Japan while increasing more moderately in the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand. However, recent tentative growth in the European Union weakened further in 1996 while 
the rate of growth also weakened somewhat in Canada. Moreover, the capacity of the industrial 
economies to productively absorb their labour force varied widely. In the United States the labour 
market was operating against capacity constraints despite suffering massive restructuring and job 
market instability in recent years. Conversely, in several continental European countries, where the 
restructuring of industry had been constrained in the name of job security and job markets were 
subject to much greater stability, unemployment reached historically high rates.
The United States of America continued to experience output growth for the fifth 
consecutive year and despite operating against capacity constraints, notably in the labour market, it
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managed the expansion with only moderate price increases. Fiscal policy received much attention in 
an election year, previous years of high fiscal deficits prompting heated debate across party lines 
about appropriate policy options. Nevertheless, despite a seemingly inauspicious political environment 
the fiscal deficit was progressively reduced from about 4.4 per cent of GDP in 1992 to just over 1 
per cent of GDP in 1996. Monetary policy was also prudent, largely being credited for the fairly long 
growth cycle with low inflation. Nevertheless, other factors contributed to containing inflation, 
notably the extensive restructuring of enterprises to release excess labour for expanding sectors. 
Openness to global trade, which forced insecure workers to moderate wage demands despite tight 
local job markets, and which encouraged cheap imports as the dollar appreciated were further 
contributing factors.
In Japan, four years of historically low growth were broken by a return to moderate growth 
in 1996. This was achieved initially by strong monetary and fiscal stimuli, with fiscal deficits being 
incurred from 1993 and reaching 4 per cent of GDP in 1996. While the steadily appreciating exchange 
rate had offset much of this stimulus, the change in trend in mid-1995 and significant depreciation into 
1996, brought with it more favourable exchange rates and attractively priced exports, thus increasing 
the prospects for early fiscal correction and the resumption of a more sustainable expansion. 
Consumer prices were stable, as compared to slight deflation in 1995, in the face of still considerable 
unused capacity. Despite the favourable outcome in 1996 the rebound was deemed to be fragile since 
consumer confidence was low with savings increasing. Accordingly, domestic economic resurgence 
was not expected to move in tandem with external performance to bolster growth in the short run.
Output expanded more slowly in the European Union in 1996 than in the previous year and 
the expansion achieved was below the average for the Industrial Countries as a whole. Weak and 
declining economic activity was evident in almost all EU countries. Exceptions were to be found only 
in Ireland, which had averaged robust growth throughout the decade, driven by internal reform, 
strong inflows of foreign investment, declining unemployment and buoyant consumer spending, and 
in Greece where there was moderate expansion. Expansion was especially weak in Germany, France 
and Italy. Consumer confidence remained low with output falling in the major economies, while 
reduced exports from Britain, Italy, Spain and several of the smaller countries to the remainder of the 
EU further dampened economic activity.
Fiscal consolidation, as several members sought to meet Maastricht reference indicators for 
accession to the European Monetary Union (EMU), was given as one reason for sluggish activity. 
Consolidation might account for the dampening effect on domestic consumption, while high and 
growing unemployment might help to explain low consumer confidence. Nevertheless, the inability 
to direct unused capacity, calculated at 2-4 per cent of Product, to non-EU markets might say 
something about real exchange rates and the need to quicken structural change to increase 
productivity. In the face of these conditions, inflationary pressures were, as expected, low, inflation 
for the EU as a whole, falling from 2.9 per cent in 1995 to 2.6 per cent in 1996.
Economic activity in Canada was sluggish in 1996, the delayed effect of quite severe fiscal 
consolidation in 1995. Nevertheless, interest rate declines and strengthening consumer confidence had 








of the expansion in the United States also exerted 
a positive influence and these factors taken 
together were expected to have a positive effect 
in 1997. Fiscal performance was positive, deficits 
which exceeded 7 per cent in 1992 and 1993 
falling to 2.4 per cent of GDP in 1996. Price 
increases were moderate in 1996 and expected to 
remain so in 1997, given the trend to further fiscal 
consolidation and sizeable unutilized capacity, 
estimated at over 3 per cent of Product, still 
existing in the economy.
Capacity constraints, which had existed in 
Australia and New Zealand since 1994 and 
required a tightening of monetary policy, limited 
the rate of expansion in both countries as inflationary pressures persisted. In Australia, growth was, 
nevertheless, expected to be fairly strong, at just under 4 per cent. In New Zealand, expansion was 
expected to be just over 2 per cent, although even this moderate pace caused the economy to exceed 
the upper limit of the inflationary target band, set at 0-2 per cent. Tightness in the labour market and 
strong activity in construction were the main contributors to overheating.
For the developing countries the rate of growth increased in Africa, Latin America and in 
the Middle East and Europe. However, the heady rates of growth experienced in Asia moderated 
somewhat, in response to fears of overheating and increased inflation. The outcome was reduced 
growth and falling inflation, though growth rates in Asia continued to greatly outstrip all other 
regions. Overall, performance of the developing countries as a group was strong, in the context of 
improved fiscal performance and declining inflation.
In Africa the rate of growth of output increased for the fifth consecutive year and was 
projected to average 5 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1996-1997. This strong




performance contrasted with an average growth of 1 per cent for the period 1991-1993. Consumer 
prices also showed a tendency to moderate for the second consecutive year. The Communauté 
Française Africaine (CFA) countries showed an even more marked turnaround, since output per 
capita had contracted by 2 per cent per annum for the period 1991-1993, whereas in 1996 per capita 
output was expected to increase by a similar amount. Moreover, throughout Africa growth seemed 
to be based on more sustainable grounds. The commodity booms evident in 1995 were over and 
strong demand from the developed countries was not present in 1996, so that internal policies of 
restructuring and reform seemed to be the force unlocking current expansion.
The rate of growth of output in Asia moderated slightly in 1996, in response to fears of 
overheating, notably in China, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Nevertheless, the resulting rate of 
expansion for the region continued to outstrip that achieved by all other regions, while inflation 
remained lower than achieved by all other developing countries. Almost all countries achieved rates 
of growth in excess of 5 per cent, the sole exception being Bangladesh which recorded 4.8 per cent. 
The growth performance achieved by these countries was all the more remarkable because of the 
relative economic maturity currently achieved by several of them, a maturity which cause d graduation 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for these countries to industrial country status1.
The highest rates of growth continued to be recorded by China and Vietnam, both countries 
in early stages of liberalization and modernization. This growth was also achieved with some 
moderation in inflation rates in 1996. The pace of adjustment in Vietnam, was especially notable, that 
country seemingly being poised for possible sustained growth. Factors in its favour were 
macroeconomic stability, achieved in part by a drastic reduction in subsidies to the public sector, high 
rates of saving and investment, an open trading system and skilled human resources. Vietnam was 
also poised to benefit from the buoyant markets and investment flows present in neighbouring 
countries. Nevertheless, working against longer-term development was the fact that although the 
household agricultural sector was strong, small and medium sized private enterprises were still almost 
non-existent. Moreover, the initial surge from agriculture was approaching its capacity limits and 
would need improvements in infrastructure, credits and extension services to further improve 
productivity. Debt management was also becoming a concern.
Policy challenges facing the Asian countries related essentially to the need for further 
adjustment to the fast changing global environment. Capital inflows to Asia presented a challenge to 
macroeconomic policy, since they had the effect of eroding the current account. They' also proved 
taxing for the domestic banking system, rapid expansions of credit putting emphasis on prudential 
supervision and capital adequacy requirements. International financial innovation also put stresses on 
countries supervisory and regulatory skills. The ASEAN countries agreed2 that they needed to
1 In April 1997, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan among the Asian countries and Israel from the 
Middle East, will cease to be considered developing countries by the IMF and will be graduated to industrial country 
status. The only other instance of graduation was for Japan.
2 Policy decisions emanating from the meeting to discuss Macroeconomic Issues Facing ASEAN countries, 
held in Indonesia in November 1996.
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accentuate several policies, for which they were already well known, such as the need to maintain 
macroeconomic stability and further reduce inflation, to increase the already high rates of public and 
private saving and to further liberalize markets, which should help to increase the pace of already 
strong total factor productivity growth. Productivity growth would also be assisted by measures to 
further strengthen human capital.
In the group of developing countries classified as the Middle East and Europe output 
expanded moderately for the second year, following virtual stagnation in 1994. Inflation also declined 
moderately, although at 26 per cent it exceeded that of all other developing country groups. Growth 
in excess of 4 per cent was experienced in Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan and Turkey. Inflation remained 
below 10 per cent for Egypt (7 per cent) and Jordan among the high growth countries, but was high 
in Iran (29 per cent ) and Turkey (85 per cent) where the fiscal deficit had ballooned to over 9 per 
cent of Product. In Israel, where growth averaged over 6 per cent for the period 1994 to 1996, it 
moderated to 5 per cent in 1996. This declining growth was in part explained by falling domestic 
demand. However, it was accompanied by increasing inflation in the face of a growing budget deficit, 
which widened slightly from 3.4 to about 3.5 per cent of Product in 1996. Consistently high growth 
and a maturing economy meant that Israel was reclassified as an Industrial Country, to take effect 
from 1997.
Lower rates of expansion were experienced by Saudi Arabia, where output expanded by under 
1 per cent with inflation of 1.8 per cent and Kuwait, where output grew by 1.6 per cent with inflation 
up by 2 per cent. In both instances, fiscal consolidation had a dampening effect on expansion. In Saudi 
Arabia, for example, the budget deficit averaged over 8 per cent for the years 1993-1995 but a small 
surplus was achieved in 1996. Nevertheless, buoyant oil prices toward the end of 1996 were expected 
to impact favourably on performance in both countries in 1997;
The trend towards moderate growth in Latin America resumed in 1996, with an average 
estimated growth rate of 3.4 per cent. This outcome followed the scant 0.3 per cent increase in output 
recorded in 1995, the average then being diminished by financial crises in Argentina and Mexico. 
With moré normal growth rates in these countries the rates of expansion continued to converge, 
seven countries exceeded 5 per cent, 13 recorded increases of between 3-5 per cent, five had a 
growth rate of 2 per cent while in the other four, output either declined or stagnated. Of these, 20 
countries were able to increase per capita incomes in 1996 (ECLAC 1996).
S ec to ra l perfo rm ance  was mixed, with agriculture and mining being positive while 
manufacturing stagnated. The Construction sector showed uneven results across countries, generally 
moving in rhythm with the economy as a whole. Services displayed moderate growth, in line with 
output generally. Total supply grew slightly faster than output, while domestic demand kept pace with 
it. At the regional level, gross capital formation recorded a moderate increase, although it manifested 
a significant upswing in Argentina and Mexico, both recovering from the previous year.
C onsum er p rices continued their steady fall, from a regional average of almost 900 per cent 
in 1993, to under 20 per cent in 1996. Convergence towards price stability was also noted, with 
inflation declining in 10 of 22 countries studied, while the index remained steady or increased only
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moderately in another 11. Only in Venezuela was the increase significant. The decline in inflation 
reflected the priority given to it by most governments and was facilitated by tight fiscal and monetary 
policies and liberalization of the external account. Nevertheless, several countries entered 1996 with 
fiscal problems, notably Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela. Changes in fiscal 
indicators in 1996 were limited to increased deficits in Argentina, up to 2 per cent of Product, while 
substantial budget balance was achieved in Venezuela.
E xports provided the motor for expansion, despite the less auspicious external environment. 
The appreciating terms of trade which were experienced between 1994-1995 came to an end in 1996, 
import prices rising marginally while the prices of several Latin American exports, such as coffee, 
copper, leather, cotton, steel, aluminum, sugar and meat fell. Offsetting these price declines, the 
prices of cereals, soybean, timber, bananas and hydrocarbons all increased. Benefits to the oil 
exporters in the region were offset by the regional importers, leaving the terms of trade unchanged 
over 1995. Simultaneously, the rate of expansion of global trade began to flag.
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Despite these external factors, several countries were able to increase export volumes 
sufficient to augment the export earnings of the region by 11 per cent. This was, however, a slower 
rate of expansion than the 19 per cent average growth rate recorded for 1994-1995. Imports 
increased by almost the same rate as exports, notable increases being recorded for Argentina and 
Mexico, recovering from import compression experienced in the previous year, while conversely the 
import boom evident in Brazil in 1995 abated. In several instances, imports rose with increasing 
output, with capital goods imports leading the increase.
The current accoun t deficit, which remained stable from the previous year, was financed by 
capital inflows which doubled over the previous year. This was made possible because the region 
regained favourable access to international capital markets, as the perception of high regional risk 
waned, following recuperation in Mexico. International interest rates were also favourable, with stable 
interest rates in the United States and low rates in Germany and Japan. The quality of capital flows 
also improved, with a large inflow3 of portfolio investments. These were mainly in seven-year bonds, 
especially to Mexico, Argentina and Brazil but also to Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. Foreign direct 
investment also recorded new peaks in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and 
Peru. Equity investments, which were depressed following the developments in Mexico, were also 
showing signs of recovery.
The external deb t increased moderately, a 3.4 per cent increase being the lowest since 1991. 
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia accounted for the bulk of the increase, the former consequent on 
government borrowing to restructure its debt, while in the latter two countries debt was incurred 
mainly by the private sector taking advantage of favourable external interest rates. Panama and 
Ecuador also increased their debt, the former in part as a result of the incorporation of interest arrears 
in its debt rescheduling exercise. In Mexico, the quantum of debt remained substantially unchanged. 
This was despite Mexico’s major intervention on the bond market, intended to raise fimdsto repay 
US$ 7 billion of the special financing received from the United States, while simultaneously obtaining 
more favourable terms. The quantum of nominal debt fell in Nicaragua and Venezuela, i n the former 
country consequent on debt forgiveness by Mexico, Germany and the Russian Federation amounting 
to US$ 4 billion. Debt burden indicators for the region continued the fairly steady improvement 
evident since 1985. More than half of the countries individually improved in 1996, consequent on 
moderate debt increases and increased rates of growth for exports of goods and services.
Despite these generally favourable indicators, unem ploym ent continued to increase for the 
sixth consecutive year, the regional average moving up to 7.7 per cent, the highest in 10 years. While 
the labour supply remained stable, job creation was sluggish, such jobs as were created being 
concentrated in tertiary activities. Only in Mexico was there a significant growth in manufacturing 
jobs as the sector returned to normal. Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela continued to experience 
difficulties in their labour markets, unable to reverse the adverse trends experienced in 1995. In 
Colombia, Brazil, Honduras and Panama unemployment grew in 1996 while in Chile, Nicaragua and 
Peru some progress was made to reduce unemployment. The quality of employment also fell in 
several instances, formal jobs declining in proportion to informal activities while even in formal 
employment contract work was making a growing presence in place of more permanent jobs.






CONSUMER PRICES • 1996
Countries n  tnrnfcien
The countries in transition seemed 
finally to be emerging from the traumatic 
adjustment which they undertook at the 
commencement of the decade (IMF, 1996). While 
progress within the group was uneven, the overall 
aggregates showed steady progress from the nadir 
experienced in 1991-1992. The steep decline in 
output evident for these countries, which in 1992 
averaged almost 15 per cent, had steadily abated, 
to show a projected slight increase in output of 
just under 1 per cent for the first time in 1996. 
Similarly, inflation had been falling steadily, from 
681 per cent in 1992 to a projected 41 per cent in
1996. Government budget deficits, which still 
remained high, nevertheless showed steady 
progress, falling from an average of 7 per cent in 1993 to an expected deficit of just under 4 per cent 
by end 1996.
Despite the underlying generally favourable prognosis for the transitional countries as a whole, 
sig n ifica n t d ifferen ces in  perform ance s till ex isted  w ith in  the group*. By far the best performance 
was recorded by the Central and Eastern European group, where output expanded in almost all cases, 
the two exceptions being Belarus and the Ukraine. If these countries were excluded, the group was 
expected to turn in average growth of over 4 per cent. Strong growth, in excess of 5 per cent, was 
evident in Albania, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic. Inflation for the 
group as a whole was contained to about 20 per cent, five members recording price increases of 10 
per cent or less. Belarus and the Ukraine turned in a weaker performance than average, growth
4 For the purposes of categorizing the countries in transition the IMF distinguished three groups: Central and 
Western Europe, Russia, and the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The former category included, Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Rumania, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia and the Ukraine. In the latter category, were to be found Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz 





continuing to contract, by 5.5 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, while inflation remained at about 
70 per cent in both countries.
Performance in R u ssia  showed steady improvement, although the pace of adjustment there 
remained behind most of the other transitional countries. The steep decline in output, which 
contracted by 15 per cent in 1994, improved somewhat to record a contraction of just over 1 per cent 
in 1996. During the same years inflation moved from 300 per cent to 51 per cent. Fiscal performance 
also showed signs of improvement during that period, moving from a deficit of over 10 per cent of 
Product to just over half that in 1996. The adjustment process was severely complicated aftd partially 
set back by the Presidential election, acute uncertainty as to the outcome and possible consequences 
for policy triggering financial market volatility, while the quest for votes may have helped to reverse 
the trend toward increased fiscal discipline, the deficit widening by one-half percentage point from 
1995.
For the cluster of transition countries in the Transcaucasus cm d C en tra l A sia , Product was 
estimated to have increased by just under 1 per cent, as compared to a contraction of output 
averaging 14 per cent for the group in 1994. Inflation fell from 1600 per cent td about 70 per cent 
over the same period. Signs of economic vibrancy were also evident within the group, notably in 
Armenia and Georgia, where growth was 6.5 and 8 per cent, respectively, with almost all other 
countries recording more moderate growth. The exceptions were Azerbaijan andTajikstan, where 
output continued to contract by 4 and 7 per cent, respectively. Inflation for the group would have 
been even lower but for high rates of inflation which continued in two members of the group, 
Tajikstan and Turkmenistan at 600 per cent and 900 per cent, respectively. Budget performance 
varied, with large deficits still being evident, for example, in Mongolia and Armenia, at nearly 11 per 
cent and 7 per cent of Product, respectively
In  sum , output declines seemed to have bottomed out in most of the transitional countries, 
with inflation falling steadily. Nominal exchange rates seemed to have stabilized in the face of falling 
inflation rates, although, since inflation exceeded that of the industrial and most other developing 
countries, real rate appreciation continued. Nevertheless, previous depreciations were believed to 
continue to provide a competitive edge for many export products, although some, especially 
agricultural exports, faced barriers to enter the nearest Western markets. Budget deficits seemed to 
be under control although tax revenues remained depressed with non-payment of taxes and energy 
payments arrears being common in many public enterprises. Payments for wages and pensions were 
also in arrears in several countries.
Despite the considerable progress made in several areas, slippage was also evident in meeting 
targets and in implementing new policies, in areas such as land reform, privatization, trade policy and 
in restructuring social safety nets. Finally, the banking sector was weak in several countries, being 
hampered by a lack of staff with sufficient experience in the new economic environment, high risk 
endemic to the transition, the previous weakness of existing enterprises, directed lending to favoured, 
though often insolvent, entities and in some instances also by fraud.
14
GLOBAL TRADE AND MARKET ARRANGEMENTS
Table IV
GLOBAL TRADE INDICATORS
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
World Trade Volume <1> 4.7 3.9 8.8 8.9 5.7
Export volumes
Industrial countries 4.3 2.4 8.3 7.3 4.3
Developing countries 9.9 8.1 11.1 11.5 10.3
Import volumes
Industrial countries 3.8 0.7 9.3 7.8 5.3
Developing countries 9.8 8.9 8.1 11.6 11.3
Terms of trade
Industrial countries 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.2
Developing countries -1.3 -1.1 0.2 0.5 -0.2
Fuel exporters 4.6 -6.3 -0.5 -6.8 3.2
Non-Fuel exporters -1.2 -0.2 0.6 -0.7 -1.0
Source: I.M.F. World Economic Outlook.
<1> Percentage annual changes in goods and services
<2> Valued in S.D.R.
W orld trade continued to outstrip world output as the process of global economi c integration 
deepened*. While the pace of trade expansion did not match that achieved in 1995, it exceeded the 
average for the previous five years. This weaker performance was attributable mainly to slowing trade 
performance turned in by the industrial countries. At the same time, the volume of trade conducted 
by the developing countries continued to grow much more quickly than that of the industrial 
countries, though at a slightly reduced pace than they achieved in 1995. The terms of trade moved 
slightly in favour of the industrial countries, although the fuel exporters among the developing 
countries experienced a modest gain in their terms of trade over the fuel importers, reversing three 
years of substantial declines.
Trade provided another indication that the uni-directional relationship between prosperity in 
the industrial countries and that in the developing countries was being modified. The changed
3 Global economic integration has been defined as “the widening and intensifying of international linkages in 
trade and finance”. For the decade 1985-1994, the ratio of world trade to GDP increased three times as fast as in the 
preceding decade. During this period FDI doubled as a share of global GDP(IBRD).
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relationship, considered by some to be structural with respect to Asia and possibly also in Latin 
America, was deemed to flow from policy changes which fostered the liberalization of trade to 
accelerate the imports of consumer and advanced capital goods to the developing countries. Policies 
also helped to reduce distortions in product and financial markets and provided a climate which 
encouraged long-term investment and output, to further stimulate the flow of exports to the industrial 
countries. This virtuous cycle also fostered diversification in output and export markets and served 
to reduce their vulnerability to external shocks. Reduced vulnerability was also achieved by a greater 
emphasis on Manufactures in the output mix of developing countries, since manufactures had a lower 
incidence of fluctuation in demand and price than the traditional primary product exports of the 
developing countries. In Asia, for example, manufactures accounted for 70 per cent of exports iri 
1990.
The diversification of export markets and the growth of intra-developing country trade was 
also fostered by the reduction of barriers to trade within regions and the growth of intraregional trade. 
Forty percent of Asia’ s exports were within Asia. In Latin America, intraregional trade did not show 
the same dynamism, activity being concentrated mainly in MERCOSUR. Intra LAIA trade actually 
fell by one per cent between 1995-1996, to 16 per cent. In the Andean Pact group intra zonal trade 
remained unchanged at about 11 per cent in 1996 and in the CACM it fell from nearly 24 per cent in 
1994 to rest at about 20 per cent in 1996. Nevertheless, within MERCOSUR intra zonal trade 
expanded, from 14 per cent of total trade in 1992 to 21 per cent in 1996 (ECLAC, 1996). 
Diversification of markets was also limited, with almost 50 per cent of Latin America’s exports being 
destined for North America while in Africa diversification was similarly limited, being concentrated 
on primary products, 50 per cent of which were destined for Europe.
Institutional developments in the field of trade.
The institutional landscape continued to be strewn with existing and emerging arrangements 
and groupings intended to liberalize trade. The most universal of them, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) held its first ministerial meeting at the end of 1996 in Singapore. The meeting 
took place while the momentum developed by the Uruguay Round was still strong. It also benefited 
from the fact that its dispute panels, which were more rigorous than those which preceded them in 
the GATT, were working well6. More than 60 disputes had been registered, 15 had been completed, 
10 of which had been settled without going before a panel. Membership in the organization was also 
rising. At the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the GATT had 92 members and this had grown to 
114 by the end of the Round. Currently the WTO had 126 members and several more were queuing 
to join7. Finally, the summit took place in the context of rapidly growing world trade in goods and 
services, while cross border investment flows were booming (Economist, 1996).
6 Under the GATT any member could veto the verdict of a panel, even if it was a party to the dispute. Under 
the WTO, panels must report within nine months and decisions can be overturned only by consensus. Parlies found 
against must cease the practice or offer compensation, otherwise they might face sanctions.
7 Thirty countries, including China and Russia, were seeking membership but were deemed not yet to have met 
WTO norms.
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Of the uncompleted issues remaining from the Uruguay Round, which included financial 
services, shipping, the movement of persons to supply services on a temporary basis, progress was 
slow. Nevertheless, the meeting fixed a deadline by which the agreement to liberalize the 
telecommunications sector was to be signed. Future action would require progress on other 
outstanding issues, such as the liberalization of agricultural trade, talks on which begin in 1999 and 
Services, talks on which were scheduled to begin in 2000. Other issues which had to be resolved 
included foreign investment, competition policy, and labour standards. The WTO would also need 
to resolve issues surrounding new members, notably China, which although the eleventh largest 
exporter, retained a largely planned economy with a regulated trade regime. Several of these 
regulations, such as export taxes, import quotas and trade licences were not compatible with the 
norms of the WTO.
Frustration at the slow progress on several of the outstanding issues had prompted members 
to seek faster action through regional trading arrangements, such as the FTAA. Yet these agreements 
also held the potential to divert trade and distort investment decisions. The plethora of overlapping 
arrangements also held the prospect of greatly complicating national responses to them and regional 
efforts to liberalize trade8. Given this complexity, swifter progress on outstanding issues was not 
assured through regional FT As which might end up being the most serious future problem for the 
WTO.
MERCOSUR gained two new members in 1996 with Chile joining the free trade area, 
comprising Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, in June and Bolivia joining in mid-December. 
Chile’s adherence took the form of an association agreement which commenced in October 1996 and 
provided for the liberalization of a substantial portion of goods traded, while sensitive products could 
be given protection for up to 18 years. The agreement with Bolivia would come into effect in April 
1997 and provided for a free trade area to be phased in over a ten year period. Simultaneously, 
MERCOSUR stepped up its talks with the Andean Community with a view to establishing a free 
trade area bètween the two groups.
At its presidential meeting in mid-December MERCOSUR discussed measures to deepen the 
grouping, agreement being reached on procedures to protect against unplanned import surges from 
outside the group, such as those which caused Brazil to hastily increase tariffs on motor vehicle 
imports. Discussions also continued on issues such as the trade in services and improved customs 
procedures, while the formation of a MERCOSUR Development Bank was also discussed. On the 
investment side, strains were also becoming evident as provinces played each other off to secure 
foreign capital.
Trade between the original four members was estimated to have grown by 12 per cent in 
1996, a four-fold increase since 1990, raising questions as to whether the Agreement was trade 
diverting. A recent study noted that, “The most dynamic products in MERCOSUR’s intra-trade 
generally are highly capital intensive products which members have not been able to export
a
Seventy-six FTA’s were either created or modified since 1948, more than half of which came into being after 
1990, according to the WTO.
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competitively to outside markets”9. Furthermore, they “have very low comparative advantage indices” 
and export indices show “that MERCOSUR countries are not competitive for these goods in third 
countries”. The study claimed further that, “MERCOSUR’s own trade barriers are responsible,” since 
“tariffs are well above the average for all imports and provide MERCOSUR members with 
preferences that may exceed 70 per cent” while “over 80 per cent of non-member country exports 
.... encounter quantity reducing or price raising non-tariff restrictions”. Denials followed from several 
regional institutions, to point out that the sector studied, essentially relating to automobiles, was not 
covered by MERCOSUR rules for the period of the study, and that the agreement was in fact 
reducing tariffs quite significantly even though the CET would not be fully in place before the year 
2000.
Nevertheless, arguments persisted about the trade diverting effects o f some regional 
arrangements, the latest being the trade diverting effects of NAFTA, where Caribbean Basin countries 
were expected to lose a significant portion of their exports to the United States unless they were 
granted parity in access conditions with Mexico.
Such parity could eventually be granted through the Free Trade Area of the Americas, for 
which discussions continued throughout Latin America and the Caribbean with a view to its 
establishment by 2005. Preparations, which proceeded in 11 working groups established to examine 
various issues crucial to its establishment, had compiled a comprehensive body of information on legal 
and institutional practices at the national level in each of the issues covered by the wor king groups. 
While necessary, data collection seemed to proceed in a policy vacuum as the United States 
leadership for the process flagged in an election year where free trade was not universally supported. 
Subsequent events suggested a desire to revitalize the process in time for the Ministerial meeting in 
Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in May 1997.
The next major outstanding issue which needed to be clarified was the process of accession 
to the FTAA. Ministers had previously agreed that the FTAA should take account of all the 
integration schemes and agreements currently in existence in the hemisphere. Yet, adherence to this 
principle would greatly complicate the accession process, since integration schemes already existed 
in the Northern hemisphere (NAFTA), the Caribbean (CARICOM), in Central America (CACM), the 
Group of Three, the Andean Group and MERCOSUR. Moreover, the ACS was formed in 1994 to 
encompass 25 countries in the CARICOM, CACM and Group of Three countries, comprising 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, as well as others in the Caribbean Basin not members of the 
aforementioned groups. Finally, 32 bilateral economic agreements had been signed between members 
of the LAIA (ECLAC 1996a). These arrangements envisaged different levels of association and 
covered varying issues.
In Western Europe the Dublin Summit held in December 1996 saw decisions taken which 
kept the EMU on schedule and kept the further widening of the European Union to the East on the 
agenda. Yet policy attention remained concentrated on the EMU, with a compromise being reached
9 Yeats, Alexander; “Does MERCOSUR’s Trade Performance Justify Concerns About the Global Welfare 
Reducing of Regional Trade Arrangements? YES!” The World Bank, 1996. (Unpublished)
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between France and Germany about the “strength” of the new currency. While the level of indicators 
was not in question the issue surfaced about the automaticity of punishment for countries not able 
to maintain budget deficits below the agreed 3 per cent of Product. Initially the Germans had 
proposed that penalties would be levied automatically except in severe recessions, defined as a 
contraction of over 2 per cent of Product. While the principle of automaticity was accepted, it applied 
only at the outer limits, that is to those with recessions of 2 per cent of Product or more. At the 
instigation of the French, discretionary powers were to be given to the Council of Ministers to waive 
punishments for the 3 per cent fiscal deficit infringement, to any country facing a contraction of 
Product of any size. Essentially, the decision to punish would become a political decision. Similarly, 
the character of the European Central Bank was still to be determined. The Germans, in line with their 
desire for a strong Euro, sought a technocratic independent Central Bank, while the French wanted 
a more flexible institution, answerable to some political authority. Despite these differences, both 
France and Germany stressed the inevitability of the EMU, which they were determined to see come 
into effect on 1 January 1999. What remained to be seen was the slate of countries which qualified 
for inaugural membership or alternatively how the criteria for entry might be further blurred. The 
softening of entry criteria could be prompted by real fears about the creation of a two-class Europe. 
These fears were fanned further by the French and Germans who sought greater flexibility to allow 
smaller groups who wished to integrate faster than the full membership to do so.
Other issues remaining to be dealt with in the near future included the widening of the EU to 
the East, common immigration and drug policy, changes in weighting of votes to give bigger 
countries greater clout, the expansion of majority voting and measures to reduce the size of the 
European Commission.
The range of issues to be tackled and the diversity of forums through which initiatives for 
global integration were being pursued, presented developing countries, and especially the smallest 
among them, with a daunting task. This was particularly true since they sought to tailor accession 
terms and timetables to coincide with regional and sub regional agendas. The task was made more 
onerous since the negotiating process was sometimes being asked to secure objectives which could 
only be secured by domestic macroeconomic policy. Accordingly, they ran the risk of diverting scarce 
resources, especially policy attention, away from the internal processes of adaptation to global 
integration, directing them instead to the futile task of changing the pace and direction of global 
events. Accordingly, multilateral action seemed to hold out the best prospect for efficiently using 
resources. Countries with common interests could benefit from multilateral action in pooling 
resources to formulate and negotiate their positions. They could also benefit by seeking integration 
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Local and foreign savings provide the resources for investment. Since the correlation between 
investment and growth is high, it is not surprising to note that the biggest savers among the 
developing countries were also the fastest growing. Notable also was the fact that those countries 
with the highest rates of domestic saving received the greatest proportion of foreign inflows. The 
linkage between these factors seemed once again to be explained by the ubiquitous issue of domestic 
macroeconomic policy. Fiscal policy also played a key role, for fiscal deficits reduce savings destined 
for productive investment. Nevertheless, care must be exercised to ensure that social expenditure is 
efficient and adequate to meet social objectives. Factors influencing the inflows of foreign savings 
included liberalization of the foreign account and the opening of domestic markets to foreign entrants.
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Significant differences continued to be evident in the relative rates of savings and investment 
shown by the respective regions. The highest saving rates were posted by Asia, which had a modest 
fiscal deficit of 1.8 per cent of Product. However the highest savers in Asia, the newly industrializing 
members have consistently achieved fiscal surpluses. Fiscal performance for the other regions closely 
mirrored savings and investment performance. Africa had a fiscal deficit estimated at 3.4 per cent of 
Product in 1996, the sub-Saharan grouping having a deficit of 5.2 per cent. The Middle-East 
averaged deficits of just under 4 per cent of Product, while Latin America averaged fiscal deficits of 
under 1 per cent for the period 1990-1994, though these increased to 1.1 per cent in 1995 and 1.3 
per cent in 1996.
Capital flows illustrated one of the more dramatic areas of new interaction between the 
industrial and developing countries. The recent flood of capital moving from the North to the South 
was to be explained by similar developments to those which fostered the flow of goods and services, 
namely, new policies to integrate developing country economies into the global economy and which 
concomitantly increased the confidence of foreign investors in developing countries and their policies. 
Especially conducive to the flow of capital were domestic financial liberalization and fewer 
restrictions to the acquisition of assets by foreigners, which provided greater incentives for direct and 
portfolio investment. Shorter-term capital flows were also induced by financial liberalization, though 
also by fewer investment opportunities and lower interest rates in the industrial countries, the latter 
factors, nevertheless, underlining the growing complementarity between both groups. These capital 
flows, especially via Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), had in turn increased the exposure of 
developing countries to advanced technologies and industrial country markets, factors redounding 
favorably on the production of goods and services for export.
The recovery of net capital flows to the developing countries was evident, following the 
setback caused by the Mexican peso crisis although the disparities between developing country 
regions continued. Of the total private net capital flows moving to developing countries in 1995 
almost 60 per cent went to Asia, 23 per cent of the remainder going to Latin America with a scant 
9 per cent going to Africa and the Middle East. While the trend of flows to Asia was steadily 
upward, Latin America had not fully recovered from the Peso crisis, 1995 flows being less than in 
1994 when it received 36 per cent. Preliminary indications were that the recovery was not complete 
in 1996 (ECLAC, 1996). In all regions direct investment exceeded portfolio investment. The picture 
with respect to official capital flows was somewhat different, with 70 per cent going to Latin 
America, 22 per cent going to Asia, with the remainder going to Africa. In the Middle East 
repayments exceeded inflows, the net account thereby being negative.
The countries in transition received increased capital flows in 1995, falling somewhat below 
Asia and Latin America, but above Africa and the Middle East in overall magnitude. Certain 
countries, however, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary received massive inflows, which as a 
percentage of GDP, 18 and 14 per cent respectively, exceeded even the strong inflows received in 
Asia. Yet the magnitude of flows in these countries severely complicated economic management and 
were expected to be significantly lower in 1996.
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DEBT
A review of the debt situation facing the poorest countries, conducted by the IMF, identified 
41 “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries”, approximately 80 per cent of which were from Africa. From 
Latin America and the Caribbean four countries were identified, namely Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras 
and Nicaragua, while two Asian countries, Vietnam and Myanmar, made the list. The criteria for 
qualification were, debt service payments in the range o f20 - 25 per cent of export earnings or a Net 
Present Value (NPV) of all claims on the country not exceeding 200 - 250 per cent of export 
earnings10. To these criteria were added several vulnerability factors such as the country’s reserve 
position, its vulnerability to shocks, its dependence on a single or small basket of commodity exports 
and the impact of debt service charges on the fiscal accounts.
The 41 countries identified were further sub-divided into three categories, namely 
“Sustainable” with 18 countries including Honduras, 12 were deemed to be “Possibly Stressed”, 
including Bolivia and Guyana, while 8 were assessed to have “Unsustainable” debt burdens, including 
Nicaragua. Three countries’ positions were undetermined, namely, Sudan, Somalia and Liberia, 
because of internal instability and an inability by these countries to adopt appropriate economic 
reform programmes. The group categorized as sustainable was deemed to be covered by existing 
arrangements such as the Naples terms, so that new arrangements were being evaluated for the 
remaining 20. Nevertheless, countries would be considered on a case-by-case basis, since their 
categorization could either improve or worsen, while debt profiles varied widely.
Relief proposed included writing-off some or all of the debt by those creditors able to do so. 
Paris Club and other bilateral creditors were asked to reduce the stock of debt by 90 per cent at the 
end of the prescribed adjustment period, instead of the previously targeted 67 per cent. For the 
multilateral agencies not having the option of debt write-off, debt service relief would be provided 
in the form of more concessional lending. The IMF, for example, would provide softer terms than 
those provided under its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The initiative would be 
linked to credible adjustment efforts by the respective countries. The World Bank was also 
considering supplemental flows via the International Development Association (IDA).
At the same time that it moved to address the debt problems of the poorest countries, the IMF 
signaled that the debt profiles of the richest and transitional countries were becoming unsustainable. 
Contrary to the views of some economists the international organization believed that the debt 
resulted in higher interest rates, lower investment and slower growth in living standards. For the 
industrial countries as a group, public debt had grown from 40 per cent of Product in 1980 to 70 per 
cent of Product in 1995, while in Greece and Italy debt was at or near 100 per cent of Product in
10 The Net Present Value of debt was defined as the sum of all future debt service obligations on existing debt, 
discounted at the market interest rate. The definition, therefore, took into account the degree of concessionality of a 
country’s debt.
22
1995. Several countries, notably Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, had experienced a doubling of their debt over the period.
Examination of industrial country fiscal positions had shown a shift in the mid-1970s following 
the first oil-price shock, where accounts previously in balance went into deficit, a deficit which began 
to widen dramatically after 1980. Imbalance seemed not to be caused by reduced revenues but rather 
a jump in expenditures directed to transfers, notably pensions, subsidies and interest payments. 
Expenditures directed to transfers and subsidies currently accounted for one-third of Product in 
France, Italy, Norway and Sweden. Budget performance was even worse than it appeared if the 
unfunded liabilities of public pensions were taken into account.
Policy proposals were based on recent research which showed that, contrary to the prevailing 
wisdom, several countries experienced growth while undertaking fiscal contraction since it permitted 
lower long-term interest rates. Moreover, such consolidation in the face of growth would contribute 
to a declining ratio of debt to GDP (IMF, 1996b). The studies also showed that robust fiscal reform 
measures were more likely to be effective than modest ones and that consolidation should emphasize 
spending cuts, especially in the government wage bill, consumption and transfers, rather than tax 
increases. It was also desirable that caps should be placed on expenditure to ensure permanent 
decreases and that fiscal consolidation be undertaken in the context of a buoyant global environment. 
Nevertheless, the external environment did not appear to figure prominently in determining the 
success of the consolidation. Finally, real exchange rate movements seemed not to be significant in 
consolidation efforts.
These findings were of interest to the developing countries, since an apparent double standard 
in policy was in the process of being removed. Up until now, stimulative fiscal policy was justified 
by several economists to spur output, while conversely the poor were admonished by agencies such 
as the IMF to pursue rigorous fiscal consolidation, if sustained growth was to be achieved. While 
increasing evidence pointed to the wisdom of the latter position, policy makers in the developing 
countries were often perplexed, looking enviously at the softer options which seemed to be at the 
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